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Appendix C 
Volunteering and Giving in a Simple Model of 
Individual Behavior 
The theory of labor supply provides a useful framework for incorporating 
decisions concerning giving and volunteering in the presence of an income 
tax. It is convenient to begin with an individual who values hours of lei- 
sure (HI),  hours spent volunteering (HJ,  his montary contributions (D), 
and the consumption of other goods (X): 
(Al) 
If this individual has a wage w,  faces a tax rate t,  and can itemize his de- 
ductions in calculating taxable income, his budget constraint is 
(A21 
where Ho  is the total number of hours available and I is exogenous non- 
wage income. Where U,  is the marginal utility of X, U,  is the marginal util- 
ity of Hv,  and so forth, the familiar first-order conditions assuming interi- 
or solutions are: 
(A31 
u = U(X,  D,  Hv, HI). 
x  = [W(HO - HI  - H") + z -  D](l-t), 
u, - p  = 0, 
(A41  uo  -  p (1-t)  = 0, 
(AS)  U"  -  p (1-t)w  = 0, 
(A61  UI  - p (1 -t)w = 0. 
The tax's incentive effect on donations is shown by the fact that in equi- 
librium the marginal rate of substitution between dollars spent on con- 
sumption and dollars donated is  UD/UX  = (1 -  t)  rather than one. The 
marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  volunteering  and  donations  is 
Uv/UD  = w,  the same that it would be in the absence of taxation. For this 292  Appendix C 
reason, as Long (1977) points out, it is neutral to allow a deduction for 
gifts of money but not a deduction for gifts of time since there is already 
an implicit deduction in the nontaxation of imputed income from the ac- 
tivity. 
Consider now a taxpayer who is not allowed to deduct monetary dona- 
tions. In this case the budget constraint is 
(A7) 
One first-order condition is changed: 
(A81 
Since the marginal rate of  substitution between donations and con- 
sumption in’this case is unity, the tax has no price effect. The other impor- 
tant change is that the marginal rate of substitution between volunteering 
and donations becomes U,/  UD = (1 -  t)  w. 
In terms of this simple model, it is possible to specify what factors will 
affect an individual’s volunteer effort. The first-order condition in (AS), 
which applies regardless of the deductibility of donations, can be rewrit- 
ten as: 
x  = [W(HO -  HI  - H,) + A(1-t)  - D. 
UD  -  p  = 0. 
(A9)  B, = (I -  t)~, 
where B, =  UJp is the individual’s marginal valuation of an hour of vol- 
unteer work and the net wage ((1 -  t)~)  is the shadow price of time, or the 
marginal cost of volunteer effort. From this, it is possible to see that vol- 
unteer effort will increase if  a) the marginal utility of  income falls, b)  the 
tax rate increases, c) the gross wage falls, or d)  the marginal utility of vol- 
unteering increases. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the analysis for the special case of a separable util- 
ity function in which charity is a composite commodity C(D,  HY).  Utility 
is 
(AW  U(X,  Hi,  C(D,  Hv)  1. 
This special case of (AZO) makes it possible to examine the individual’s 
choice between donations and volunteering given an amount of “full in- 
come” (monetary income plus nonworking time) donated to charity. In 
the absence of a deduction for contributions, the budget set defined by 
this amount of full income is given by D  + (1 -  t)w  H, = kO,  where D is 
again donations,  (1 -  t)w is the net wage or shadow price of time, H, is 
hours of volunteering, and ko is a constant. 